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Kent McNeil and Kerry Wilkins, “Welcome Home: Aboriginal Rights Law
after Desautel”

Abstract: In R v Desautel, decided April 23, 2021, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
held, for the first time, that an Indigenous community located in the United States, whose
members are neither citizens nor residents of Canada, can have an existing Aboriginal right,
protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to hunt a specified area within Canada.
This will be so, the Supreme Court majority held, where the community can show that it
descends from (is a successor of) an Indigenous community that was present in what is now
Canada at the time of the ancestral community’s first contact with Europeans and that hunting in
the relevant part of Canada was integral to its way of life at that time. Justices Côté and
Moldaver dissented. This article analyzes the majority decision, comments on the dissenting
judgments. and delves into some unresolved issues that will need attention in light of the
decision. They include the status of common law Aboriginal rights, the notion of sovereign
incompatibility, the optimal way of litigating claims of Aboriginal right, and the impact of the
decision on Aboriginal title claims and the duty to consult.

Richard Lee Desautel, an American citizen, is a member of the Lakes Tribe, one of the
Confederation Colville Tribes (CCT). He resides with other members of the Lakes Tribe on the
Colville Indian Reservation in the state of Washington. He has never lived in Canada.
The Lakes Tribe traces its ancestry to an Indigenous group usually called the Sinixt, whose
traditional territory straddles the Canada/US border from south-central British Columbia to
Kettle Falls in Washington State. In 2010, Mr. Desautel, acting on instructions from the CCT’s
Fish and Wildlife Director, entered British Columbia legally and shot an elk within traditional
Sinixt territory near Castlegar, B.C., to secure ceremonial meat for his community. He reported
the kill to the B.C. wildlife authorities. He was charged with two violations under B.C.’s Wildlife
Act: hunting without a license and hunting big game without a guide while a non-resident.1 At
trial, he admitted the essential elements of the offences but asserted an existing Sinixt Aboriginal
right to hunt for food and ceremonial purposes within traditional Sinixt territory in British
Columbia. The two relevant offence provisions, he argued, infringe that right unjustifiably.
The trial judge concluded that hunting within traditional Sinixt territory for those purposes in
what is now British Columbia was integral to the distinctive Sinixt way of life at and before their
first contact with Europeans in 1811, and that the Lakes Tribe is a successor group to the
ancestral Sinixt.2 Ordinarily, this would suffice to establish an existing Aboriginal right,
recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, that would protect Lakes
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Tribe members hunting within that territory.3 However, the Crown had argued that section 35
afforded no constitutional protection to the Lakes Tribe because it guaranteed only “the existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada” 4 and the Lakes Tribe, residing
outside Canada, could not qualify as “aboriginal peoples of Canada.” In the alternative, the
Crown submitted, no Aboriginal right could protect Sinixt hunting in their traditional territory
within B.C. because there was no evidence that any of them had hunted there between 1930 and
2010, the year Mr. Desautel shot the elk. Finally, the Crown argued in the further alternative, any
Aboriginal right the Lakes Tribe might have would necessarily include an incidental right to
cross the international border for hunting purposes. No such right could exist, the argument ran,
because it would be incompatible with Canada’s power to control and defend the international
border, an essential attribute of Crown sovereignty.
At trial, Judge Mrozinski rejected these arguments. In her view, an Indigenous group that resided
and engaged in integral harvesting practices in what is now B.C. at the time of first contact with
Europeans is entitled to the protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Sinixt
ancestors of the present-day Lakes Tribe had indeed migrated into the southern (American) part
of their traditional territory in sufficient numbers to achieve recognition as a tribe under
American law by 1872, but their exodus was not voluntary; “it was a matter of making the best
choice out of a number of bad choices.”5 Moreover, the absence of evidence that Lakes Tribe
members had hunted in B.C. after 1930 was not fatal to Mr. Desautel’s claim to an Aboriginal
right.6 Finally, she observed, it was not necessary to consider the “sovereign incompatibility”
issue because Mr. Desautel had entered Canada legally, without incident, and was not claiming
an Aboriginal right to cross the international border. 7 According to Mrozinski J, therefore, Mr.
Desautel and the Lakes Tribe have an existing Aboriginal right to hunt for food and ceremony in
traditional Sinixt territory in B.C. The offence provisions with which he was charged infringed
that right, and the Crown had failed to justify the infringement. Mr. Desautel was acquitted. 8
On appeal, the B.C. Supreme Court agreed.9 So, on further appeal, did the B.C. Court of
Appeal.10 On April 23, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 7-2 decision (Côté and
Moldaver JJ dissenting), dismissed the Crown’s final appeal.11 According to Justice Rowe, who
wrote for the majority, the Crown was correct to insist that only Indigenous groups that qualify
as “aboriginal peoples of Canada” are entitled to the protection of section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.12 But “Aboriginal peoples of Canada under s. 35(1),” the Court held, “are the modernday successors of Aboriginal societies that occupied what is now Canada at the time of European
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contact.”13 On the findings of the trial judge, the Lakes Tribe meets this requirement.14 This, and
the further finding that hunting for food and ceremony within south central B.C. was integral to
the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the time of contact, sufficed, in the Court’s view, to establish
the Lakes Tribe’s entitlement to an Aboriginal right to do so today.15 The Court thought the
border issue, along with several other issues the Crown and other attorneys general raised in their
Supreme Court submissions (the Crown’s duty to consult, the common law status of Aboriginal
rights, and provisions in modern treaties about non-resident Indigenous peoples, among others)
could await resolution in subsequent cases in which the facts required decisions about them.
In this article, we discuss the Court’s reasons for the conclusions it reached and some of the
issues that now will require attention in the wake of Desautel – issues that Rowe J identified but
deferred.
Interpretation of “aboriginal peoples of Canada”
The main issue in the Supreme Court was the proper interpretation of “aboriginal peoples of
Canada” in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35(1) provides that “The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed.” The two principal judgments agreed that the framers of section 35 never considered
whether Indigenous groups residing outside Canada could be “aboriginal peoples of Canada,” 16
but differed sharply in their approaches to this issue.
Justice Rowe applied the purposive approach to interpretation of section 35(1) articulated in
previous cases, especially R v Van der Peet:17
[T]he two purposes of s. 35(1) are to recognize the prior occupation of Canada by
organized, autonomous societies and to reconcile their modern-day existence with
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over them. These purposes are reflected in the
structure of Aboriginal rights and title doctrine, which first looks back to the
practices of groups that occupied Canadian territory prior to European contact,
sovereignty or effective control, and then expresses those practices as constitutional
rights held by modern-day successor groups within the Canadian legal order. 18
Aboriginal rights (apart from title and Métis rights 19), including the hunting right in Desautel, are
based on the practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Indigenous cultures at the
time of contact with Europeans. 20 These rights therefore relate back to Indigenous peoples’ preIbid at para 47. Rowe J acknowledged expressly that “this criterion will need to be modified in the case of the
Métis” but left that modification for another day: ibid at para 32.
14
Ibid at para 48.
15
See ibid at para 62.
16
See ibid at paras 41 (Rowe J), 115, 119 (Côté J).
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Aboriginal title is based on exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty:
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]. Métis Aboriginal rights, apart from title (the
test for which has not been determined by the Supreme Court), are based on Métis practices, customs, and traditions
at the time of effective European control: R v Powley, [2003] 2 SCR 207.
20
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colonial use of land and resources in their ancestral territories in accordance with their own
practices and laws. From this, Justice Rowe concluded, rightly in our opinion, that “the scope of
‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ is clear: it must mean the modern-day successors of Aboriginal
societies that occupied Canadian territory at the time of European contact. As a result, groups
whose members are neither citizens nor residents of Canada can be Aboriginal peoples of
Canada.”21 Members of the Lakes Tribe of Sinixt people living in Washington State, including
Mr. Desautel, could therefore have constitutionally-protected rights in their ancestral territory in
Canada.
Justice Côté dissented on this issue.22 She regarded the majority’s understanding of the meaning
of “aboriginal peoples of Canada” to be
… contrary to a purposive analysis of s. 35 that examines the linguistic, philosophic,
and historical contexts of that provision. This Court’s s. 35(1) jurisprudence has
characterized – properly, in my view – reconciliation in terms of the relationship
between non-Aboriginal Canadians and Aboriginal peoples as full and equal
members of, and participants in, Canadian society.23
In her opinion, the drafters of section 35 could not possibly have intended the provision to
include non-resident Indigenous groups.24
Justice Côté thus considered reconciliation apposite only to the segments of Indigenous nations
that happened to end up and stay in Canada after Britain and the United States drew their
international border in the 18th and 19th centuries.25 These colonial actions bifurcated many
Indigenous nations, taking no account of their presence on and relationship with their traditional
territories. Côté J’s view would perpetuate these adverse effects, leaving the Indigenous
members of these nations who reside in the United States separated from their homelands and
relatives in Canada. This would hardly serve the interests of reconciliation. Justice Rowe’s
approach, on the other hand, does promote reconciliation precisely because it takes account of
the disruptive effects of these insensitive and disrespectful colonial initiatives. It is a step
towards righting that earlier injustice.
The Van der Peet Integral to the Distinctive Culture Test and Continuity
Establishing that the Sinixt are an Aboriginal people of Canada was a threshold requirement for
the majority of the Supreme Court. In addition, for Mr. Desautel to have an Aboriginal right to
hunt for food, social, and ceremonial purposes in their ancestral territory in Canada, the practice,
21

Desautel, supra note 11 at para 23.
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custom, and tradition of hunting had to be integral to pre-contact Sinixt culture, as required by
the test created in the Van der Peet case in 1996. Justice Rowe said the test for groups outside
Canada is the same as for groups within Canada and decided that the trial judge had applied the
test correctly in determining that the Sinixt People have a right to hunt in their ancestral territory
in Canada. However, he had more to say about the continuity that is required between the
historical practice, custom, and tradition and the modern practice that is alleged to be protected
as an Aboriginal right, as both Justice Côté and Justice Moldaver dissented on this matter.
Continuity in this sense means only that the modern practice has to be sufficiently like the
historical practice to fall within the scope of the right arising from the practice, custom, or
tradition at the time of contact. 26 But the dissenting judges thought that the continuity
requirement also necessitates a degree of continuation of the practice over the intervening time
period. Justice Côté, Moldaver J concurring on this issue, opined that, “while temporal gaps in
the actual practice do not necessarily preclude the establishment of an Aboriginal right (Van der
Peet, at para. 65), failing to tender sufficient evidence that the practice was maintained or, at
least, that a connection to the historical practice was maintained during such gaps may be
fatal.”27 She emphasized the absence in the factual record of any evidence that the Lakes Tribe
had hunted in Canada between 1930 and 2010, when Mr. Desautel shot the elk. In her view,
“[c]ontinuity cannot be established simply because there is evidence that ‘the land was not
forgotten’ in the minds of the Lakes Tribe members…. A single shot cannot create the Lakes
Tribe’s modern exercise of the right.”28
The majority understood continuity differently. In one sense, Justice Rowe said it can have a role
in proof. Evidence that
… a practice is integral to the claimant’s culture today, and that it has continuity with
pre-contact times, can count as proof that the practice was integral to the claimant’s
culture pre-contact…. As Kent McNeil explains, “continuity of this sort has to be
shown only when Aboriginal peoples rely on post-sovereignty occupation or postcontact practices, customs, and traditions as evidence of their pre-sovereignty
occupation or pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions.”29
Another use of the concept of continuity is in the determination of
… whether the modern practice which is claimed to be an exercise of an Aboriginal
right is connected to, and reasonably seen as a continuation of, the pre-contact
practice. At this stage, continuity with the pre-contact practice is required in order for
the claimed activity to fall within the scope of the right. It serves to avoid frozen
rights, allowing the practice to evolve into modern forms…. The right claimed “must
26

See R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 67 [Marshall/Bernard].
Desautel, supra note 11 at para 130.
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Ibid at paras 136-37.
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Ibid at para 53, quoting “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights”, Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims:
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004), 127 at 138. The Court relied as well on Van der
Peet, supra note 3 at paras 62-63; R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 28 [Gladstone]; Delgamuukw, supra
note 19 at para 152; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, [2014] 2 SCR 257 at para 45 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
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be allowed to evolve”, because “[i]f aboriginal rights are not permitted to evolve and
take modern forms, then they will become utterly useless.”30
Unlike the dissenting judges, who were concerned about the temporal aspect of continuity, the
emphasis of the majority was thus on the use of the concept to determine the scope of the
contemporary right and the need to include modern ways to exercise it.
The Crown argued that “continuity requires an ongoing presence in the lands over which an
Aboriginal right is asserted.”31 Justice Rowe responded as follows:
As my discussion of continuity should make clear, this has never been part of the test
for an Aboriginal right. Nor is there any basis for adding it to the test, even where the
claimant is outside Canada. As Lamer C.J. explained in Van der Peet, at para. 65, “an
unbroken chain of continuity” is not required. Indeed, as McLachlin J. (dissenting,
but not on this point) noted in Van der Peet, at para. 249, “it is not unusual for the
exercise of a right to lapse for a period of time”. 32
Justice Rowe’s position on this is consistent with common law principles. Legal rights, once
acquired, are not lost through non-user.33 In Re Yateley Common, Justice Foster said this in
regard to a customary right to a common:
A right of common is a legal right, and it is exceedingly difficult to prove that a
person having such a legal right has abandoned it. Non-user, if the owner of the right
has no reason to exercise it, requires something more than an immense length of time
of non-user. It is essential that it is proved to the court’s satisfaction that the owner of
the legal right has abandoned the right – in the sense that he not only has not used it
but intends never to use it again. The onus lies fairly and squarely on those who
assert that the right has been abandoned. 34
Similarly, in Tehidy Minerals Ltd. v Norman, Buckley LJ held that “[a]bandonment of an
easement or of a profit à prendre can only, we think, be treated as having taken place where the
person entitled to it has demonstrated a fixed intention never at any time thereafter to assert the

30

Desautel, supra note 11 at para 54, quoting R v Sappier; R v Gray [2006] 2 SCR 686 at paras 48-49
[Sappier/Gray]. Cited as well on the evolution of practices into modern forms are Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para.
64 and Mitchell v MNR, [2001] 1 SCR 911 at para 13 [Mitchell].
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Desautel, supra note 11 at para 63.
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Ibid. See also R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at paras 157-81, where Cromwell JA (later on the SCC), after
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assertion of sovereignty, continues without any need to prove occupation from sovereignty to the present. This
decision was overturned on appeal without consideration of this issue because the SCC found, on the facts, that
Aboriginal title had not been established: Marshall/Bernard, supra note 26.
33
But see the discriminatory and rightly criticized judgment of the High Court of Australia in Yorta Yorta
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002), 194 ALR 538. See Richard Bartlett, “An Obsession with Traditional Laws
and Customs Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta” (2003) 31 Western
Australia L Rev 35; Kirsten Anker, “Law in the Present Tense: Tradition and Cultural Continuity in Members of the
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria” (2004) 28 Melbourne U L Rev 1; Simon Young, The Trouble with
Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008), especially 317-34, 406-14.
34
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right himself or to attempt to transmit it to anyone else.”35 Lord Denning MR, in Wyld v Silver,
likewise rejected the notion that a customary right to hold a fair could be lost by non-user:
I know of no way in which the inhabitants of a parish can lose a right of this kind
once they have acquired it except by Act of Parliament. Mere disuse will not do. And
I do not see how they can waive it or abandon it. No one or more of the inhabitants
can waive or abandon it on behalf of the others. Nor can all the present inhabitants
waive or abandon it on behalf of future generations. 36
Lord Denning’s judgment is particularly relevant to Aboriginal rights because, like customary
rights in England, they are held by groups rather than individuals for the benefit of future
generations as well as current members. 37 What justification, one might ask, could there possibly
be for treating the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada less favourably than
customary rights are treated in England by the common law?
In Desautel, Justice Rowe observed that, “In effect, we are asked [by the Crown] to hold that an
Aboriginal right can be lost or abandoned by non-use: a proposition that Lamer C.J. left
undecided in Van der Peet, at para. 63. Would accepting this proposition risk ‘undermining the
very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at
the hands of colonizers’?”38 He then stated that “It is better not to decide the issue here, as it does
not arise in light of the factual findings of the trial judge.”39 This was an odd thing for him to say,
given that the evidence did not reveal any Sinixt hunting in Canada from 1930 to 2010, and that
the Crown argued that the right to hunt had been lost as a result. In effect, Justice Rowe did
decide that non-user of the right for 80 years did not cause it to be lost.
Justice Rowe’s reference to Chief Justice Lamer’s statement in R v Côté that courts should avoid
adopting propositions that would perpetuate historical injustice is significant. That statement was
made in the context of the Crown’s argument in Côté that French law in Canada prior to the
transfer of New France to Britain in 1763 did not acknowledge Aboriginal rights. The Supreme
Court decided that the Crown’s position, if correct,
… would create an awkward patchwork of constitutional protection for aboriginal
rights across the nation, depending upon the historical idiosyncrasies of colonization
over particular regions of the country. In my respectful view, such a static and
35

[1971] 2 QB 528 (CA) at 553. See also Ward v Ward (1852), 7 Ex 838 at 839; Gotobed v Pridmore (1970), 115
Sol Jo 78 (CA).
36
[1963] 1 Ch 243 (CA) at 255-56. See also Scales v Key (1840), 11 Ad & E 819 (QB) at 825-26, where Lord
Denman CJ observed that the jury’s finding, “that the custom had existed till 1689, was the same in effect as if they
had found that it had existed till last week, unless something appeared to shew that it had been legally abolished.”
See also Heath v Deane, [1905] 2 Ch 86 at 93-94; New Windsor Corporation v Mellor, [1975] 3 All ER 44 (CA) at
50-51 (Lord Denning MR), 53 (Browne LJ).
37
In Re Tucktoo and Kitchooalik (1972), 27 DLR (3d) 225 (NWTTC), affirmed Re Kitchooalik and Tucktoo (1972),
28 DLR (3d) 483 (NWTCA), Morrow J held that the rule that customs can be abolished only by statute applies to
Inuit customs relating to adoption, and that the legislation would have to be either repugnant to those customs, or
directly or by implication intended to abolish them.
38
Desautel, supra note 11 at para 64, quoting from R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 53 [Côté].
39
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7

retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble and
prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent’s proposed interpretation risks
undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice
suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the
distinctive cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies.40
For the Sinixt, colonization had a series of negative impacts, starting with smallpox epidemics.41
In 1846, the creation of the international boundary by the Oregon Boundary Treaty split their
ancestral territory in two. In 1896, the B.C. Game Protection Amendment Act made it unlawful
for them to hunt in British Columbia,42 so they would have had to do so surreptitiously. Justice
Rowe noted, “The trial judge did not find that the Sinixt were forced out of Canada ‘at gunpoint’
(para. 101), but nor did she find that the move was voluntary, as the Lakes Tribe never gave up
their claim to their traditional territory in Canada.”43 The notion that any Indigenous people
would have voluntarily abandoned their homeland in the face of colonization strains credulity.44
In case there was doubt on the issue before, the correct position on continuity is that sustained
use (or occupation in the case of Aboriginal title) is not required to maintain Aboriginal rights
based on practices, customs, and traditions at the time of contact (or Aboriginal title based on
exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty). 45 If the Crown wants to
allege the rights have subsequently been lost (other than by voluntary surrender by treaty), it has
to prove legislative extinguishment prior to enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.46 Extinguishment would require clear and plain legislation, 47 just as extinguishment of
customary and other legal rights in England requires unambiguous legislation.48 If the view of
the dissenting judges had prevailed, on the other hand, sufficient informal interference with
40

Côté, supra note 38 at para 53.
R v DeSautel, supra note 2 at paras 15-18.
42
SBC 1896, c 22, s 6: “It shall be unlawful for Indians not resident of this Province to kill game at any time of the
year.” See Desautel, supra note 11 at para 5.
43
Desautel, supra note 11 at para 5.
44
See ibid at para 33, quoted in text accompanying note 144 infra.
45
Where title generally is concerned, it is not lost by leaving land vacant for long periods of time or even
indefinitely, provided an adverse possessor does not dispossess the owner, in which case the owner’s title is
extinguished by statute. At common law, it was even doubtful that title could be abandoned, because in that case an
abeyance of seisin (possession entailing a title) would result, which the common law abhorred. As Pollock and
Maitland wrote, “It seems very doubtful whether a man could (or can) get rid of a seisin once acquired, except by
delivering seisin to some one else”: Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law
Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1898, reissued 1968), II, 54 n 2. See
also Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 63.
46
In Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 28, Lamer C.J. said that “[s]ubsequent to s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act,
1982] aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed consistent with the
justificatory test laid out by this Court in Sparrow.” This was affirmed by McLachlin CJ in Mitchell, supra note 30
at para 11.
47
See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1099 [Sparrow]; Gladstone, supra note 29 at paras 31-38; Delgamuukw,
supra note 19 at para 180.
48
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue (Butterworths: London, 1998), vol 12(1), para 646. For detailed
discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L Rev 301.
41
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integral Indigenous practices “at the hands of colonizers”, though wholly insufficient as evidence
of extinguishment, probably would have doomed otherwise meritorious claims of Aboriginal
right derived from those practices.
Section 35(1) Rights and Common Law Aboriginal Rights
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not create Aboriginal rights; instead, it provided
constitutional protection to pre-existing rights by recognizing and affirming them. 49 As Chief
Justice Lamer affirmed in Van der Peet, “aboriginal rights existed and were recognized under the
common law.”50 In Desautel, the Crown argued that, “while Mr. Desautel cannot have a s.
35(1) Aboriginal right, because he is not a member of an Aboriginal people of Canada, he can
still have common law Aboriginal rights, albeit these rights would not constitute a defence to the
regulatory charges against him.”51 Justice Rowe, while not dismissing the possibility that some
Indigenous groups could have common law Aboriginal rights,52 said this would “introduce
additional difficulties” because, “[i]n particular, the Crown seems to assume that the test for a
common law Aboriginal right would be the same as the test for a s. 35(1) Aboriginal right, that
is, the Van der Peet test. But this is far from clear.”53 He went on to explain:
Before 1982, common law Aboriginal rights were recognized in Canada under
British imperial law (Calder, at pp. 328 and 402; Mitchell, at paras. 62-64). Under
the imperial doctrine of succession, when Britain took possession of a new territory,
the laws in force in that territory were presumed to continue (subject to some
exceptions). This doctrine was not limited to practices, traditions or customs that
were “integral to the distinctive culture” of the Aboriginal people, as in Van der Peet.
This suggests, on the one hand, that the test for a common law right may be met even
where the Van der Peet test is not.54
In other words, although pre-existing rights in Indigenous law became enforceable as common
law rights after Crown assertion of sovereignty, not all those pre-existing rights would meet the
Van der Peet test for section 35(1) Aboriginal rights. That test sanctioned only rights based on
practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures; not all common law
rights derived from pre-existing Indigenous law would be “integral” to distinctive Aboriginal
cultures in the sense understood by the Supreme Court. Moreover, to give rise to section 35(1)
Aboriginal rights, the practices, customs, and traditions must have been integral at the time of

49

Desautel, supra note 11 at paras 34 (Rowe J) and 139 (Côté J).
Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 28, citing Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313.
51
Desautel, supra note 11 at para 67.
52
Ibid at paras 67-70. See also paras 139-40 (Côté J).
53
Ibid.at para 67.
54
Ibid at para 68. See also para 34, where Rowe J relied on an article by Mark Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of
Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill LJ 711,
discussing the continuation of Indigenous laws and rights after British assertion of sovereignty.
50
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European contact, not at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, which would be the time
when Indigenous law rights became enforceable at common law. 55
In Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer offered this explanation for limiting section 35(1)
Aboriginal rights to integral practices, customs, and traditions:
The task of this Court is to define aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes that
aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing sight of the fact that they
are rights held by aboriginal people because they are aboriginal. The Court must
neither lose sight of the generalized constitutional status of what s. 35(1) protects,
nor can it ignore the necessary specificity which comes from granting special
constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society.56
Later in the judgment, the Chief Justice used reconciliation as a justification for limiting the
scope of constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights:
In order to fulfil the purpose underlying s. 35(1) – i.e., the protection and
reconciliation of the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of
Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive
societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions – the test for identifying
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed at
identifying the crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies. It must, in
other words, aim at identifying the practices, traditions and customs central to the
aboriginal societies that existed in North America prior to contact with the
Europeans.57
Under the Van der Peet test, section 35(1) protects only “crucial” or “central” aspects of
Indigenous societies. Common law Aboriginal rights based on pre-existing Indigenous law that
are not regarded by the Court as sufficiently integral to Indigenous cultures would not meet the
test.
And yet in Delgamuukw, a year after Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer stated, in a passage
Justice Rowe cites in Desautel,58 that “[t]he existence of an aboriginal right at common law is …
sufficient, but not necessary, for the recognition and affirmation of that right by s. 35(1).”59 This
55
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suggests two things. First, section 35(1) probably includes Aboriginal rights that are not common
law Aboriginal rights (this is “not necessary”), because section 35(1) rights can arise from
practices, whereas common law Aboriginal rights would need to be based on Indigenous law. 60
Lamer CJ acknowledged as much in Delgamuukw: “the common law should develop to
recognize aboriginal rights (and title, when necessary) as they were recognized by either de
facto practice or by the aboriginal system of governance.” 61 Second, because the existence of a
common law Aboriginal right is “sufficient” for section 35(1) recognition, rights established by
proof of their pre-existence in Indigenous law should not need to meet the Van der Peet integral
requirement.62
In Desautel, Justice Rowe acknowledged that there is “apparent tension” between common law
Aboriginal rights and the Van der Peet integral to the distinctive culture test, but, given his
conclusion that Mr. Desautel has a section 35(1) Aboriginal right under the Van der Peet test, he
found it unnecessary to say more about it.63 This leaves open the hopeful possibility that, in a
future case, the Court might accept that there are two sources of section 35(1) Aboriginal rights,
namely, (1) practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures at the
time of European contact (or exclusive occupation of land where Aboriginal title is concerned),
and (2) common law recognition of rights based on Indigenous law at the time of Crown
assertion of sovereignty. Acknowledging the second source would provide constitutional
protection to Indigenous law rights that do not meet the Van der Peet integral test.64 As far as we
are aware, none of the section 35(1) cases decided by the Court so far precludes this possibility.65
Aboriginal Title
Justices Rowe and Côté both acknowledged that interpreting “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in
section 35(1) to include groups not resident in Canada could have consequences for Aboriginal
title claims. Justice Rowe decided that, given the differences between Aboriginal title and other
Aboriginal rights and the fact that title was not at issue in Desautel, this matter could be left for
another day.66 For Justice Côté, however, the matter raised serious concerns: “It would be a
See Kent McNeil & David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected
Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L Rev (2nd) 177 at 210; Richard Ogden, “‘Existing’ Aboriginal Rights
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remarkable proposition that a foreign group could hold constitutionally protected title to
Canadian territory, as the required incidental mobility right would be fundamentally
incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.”67 These concerns were another reason for her to
conclude that the drafters of section 35(1) could not have intended “aboriginal peoples of
Canada” to include groups not resident in Canada, such as Lakes Tribe of the Sinixt. 68
Justice Côté’s observation that Aboriginal title claims could potentially be brought by Indigenous
groups outside Canada is correct. As she pointed out, the Sinixt themselves have a title claim to
their traditional territory in the Kootenay region of south central British Columbia. In Campbell v
British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range),69 the directors of the Sinixt Nation Society, a
representative body of the Sinixt Nation, sought an interim injunction to stop logging in a portion
of the Sinixt traditional territory in B.C., pending judicial review of a licence issued by the
province to a logging company. In 2008, two years before the licence was issued, representatives
of the Sinixt Nation had commenced legal action against British Columbia and Canada in which
they claim Aboriginal title to their traditional territory in B.C. In Campbell, the petitioners
alleged breach of the Crown’s duty to consult the Sinixt Nation before issuing the logging
licence. The injunction petition was dismissed, mainly on the ground that the directors of the
Sinixt Nation Society lacked standing to bring it,70 but the case confirms that a Sinixt Aboriginal
title claim is at least in contemplation. No doubt other Indigenous groups now resident in the
United States whose traditional territories extend into Canada will also be considering whether to
initiate Aboriginal title claims in light of the Desautel decision.
The question of the rights-bearing entity, an issue in Campbell that is present in Aboriginal rights
as well as title cases, 71 did not arise in Desautel because Justice Rowe accepted the trial judge’s
factual findings that “the Sinixt had occupied territory in what is now British Columbia at the
time of European contact” and that “the Lakes Tribe were a modern successor of the Sinixt –
leaving open the possibility that there may be others…. The migration of the Lakes Tribe from
British Columbia to a different part of their traditional territory in Washington did not cause the
group to lose its identity or its status as a successor to the Sinixt.”72 Consequently, Justice Rowe
concluded:
This case does not require the Court to set out criteria for successorship of Aboriginal
communities. This is a complex issue that should be dealt with on a fuller factual
record, with the benefit of legal argument. For example, consideration would have to
67
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be given to the possibility that a community may split over time, or, that two
communities may merge into one, as well as to the relative significance of factors
such as ancestry, language, culture, law, political institutions and territory in
connecting a modern community to its historical predecessor.73
In Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,74 the whole nation rather than individual bands was
held to have Aboriginal title, but that was based on evidence of the Tsilhqot’in government
structure and laws.75 In Desautel, Justice Rowe stated, “It is for Aboriginal peoples … to define
themselves and to choose by what means to make their decisions, according to their own laws,
customs and practices.”76 Accordingly, the title-holding entity for the Sinixt would depend on
their own laws. As not all Sinixt appear to be members of the Lakes Tribe, 77 title might be vested
in the Sinixt Nation as a whole, but again, that would depend on Sinixt law. 78
So what would an Indigenous group residing in the United States have to prove to have
Aboriginal title in Canada? As with regard to the Aboriginal hunting right at issue in Desautel,
they would have to show they are the successors (or a successor) of an Indigenous group that
occupied territory in Canada. However, the time frame would be different: instead of proving
their presence somewhere in Canada at the time of first contact with Europeans, they would have
to show they were there at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty (in B.C., 1846
instead of 1811 for the Sinixt hunting right). The test for title is also different: instead of being
based on a practice, custom, or tradition integral to their distinctive culture, it would be based on
exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty.79
As mentioned previously, in her dissent Justice Côté expressed concern over the possibility that
Indigenous groups in the United States could have Aboriginal title in Canada, in particular
because she thought that would require an “incidental mobility right [that] would be
fundamentally incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.”80 But why would Aboriginal title
necessitate an incidental right to enter Canada any more than the Aboriginal hunting right at
issue in Desautel would require a right of entry, which Mr. Desautel did not claim? 81 Subject to
73
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Canadian law, individuals who are not Canadian citizens can own land in Canada without this
necessitating a right of entry. However, if, as many have argued and we accept,82 Aboriginal title
includes governance authority, a declaration of title in favour of an Indigenous group resident in
the United States could present complex jurisdictional issues. But comparable issues, such as the
extent of Indigenous governance authority and the application of federal and provincial laws on
Aboriginal title lands, also arise where Aboriginal title is held by groups resident in Canada. 83
Moreover, Aboriginal rights apart from title, such as the Sinixt hunting right, could entail
governance rights, given their communal nature. 84 These matters can and should be dealt with
politically through the negotiation of treaties. 85
Duty to Consult
The Crown has an enforceable obligation to consult a given Indigenous community when it
contemplates conduct, or faces a decision, that, to its knowledge, might have an appreciable
adverse effect on a constitutionally protected treaty or Aboriginal right that the community has or
credibly claims.86 Throughout the proceedings, and in its written submissions to the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Crown called attention to practical challenges it would face if Indigenous
groups located outside Canada were eligible to have or to claim such rights. “From a strictly
quantitative perspective,” the Crown argued, conferring such eligibility on “US Indigenous
groups” “would dramatically increase the number of groups with whom the Crown may need to
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consult and, where appropriate[,] accommodate.” 87 “From a qualitative perspective,” it added,
“requiring the Crown to consult, and where appropriate accommodate, US Indigenous groups is
likely to come with difficulties unforeseen by the Court in Haida, and unforeseeable even
now.”88 One such difficulty that received attention during oral argument was the challenge of
identifying Indigenous groups located outside Canada that might have Aboriginal rights in
Canada.
The majority in Desautel addressed this last issue squarely. “Given the long history of CrownAboriginal relations in Canada,” Justice Rowe said,
… the Crown will often be aware of the existence of Aboriginal groups within
Canada and may have some sense of their claims. The situation is different when it
comes to Aboriginal groups outside of Canada. In the absence of some historical
interaction with them, the Crown may not know, or have any reason to know, that
they exist, let alone that they have potential rights within Canadian territory.
There is no freestanding duty on the Crown to seek out Aboriginal groups,
including those outside Canada, in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge
of a potential impact on their rights. In the absence of such knowledge, the Crown is
free to act. It is for the groups involved to put the Crown on notice of their claims.89
This is the clearest statement to date from the Court that the onus is on an Indigenous group to
acquaint the Crown with its Aboriginal rights claims. In practice, it means that the Crown need
not concern itself with Indigenous groups residing outside Canada (or, arguably, even within
Canada) unless they have identified themselves and their claims to the Crown.
But “[o]nce the Crown is put on notice, … it has to determine whether a duty to consult arises
and, if so, what the scope of the duty is.”90 Ordinarily, “the scope of the duty [to consult] is
proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of
the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title
claimed.”91 In practice, the latter of these criteria – the seriousness of the potentially adverse
effect – has been the more important. In Desautel, the Court allowed that “the duty to consult
may well operate differently as regards those outside Canada,”92 because “groups outside Canada
are not implicated … to the same degree” in the “‘process of fair dealing and reconciliation’
which ‘arises … from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty’.” 93 By way of example, it suggested
that “[i]ntegrating groups outside Canada into consultations by the Crown with groups inside
87
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Canada may involve discussions within Aboriginal communities and with the Crown.” 94 But
such challenges, Rowe J insisted, are not sufficient reason for defeating or denying claims of
Aboriginal right that are otherwise meritorious. 95 Here too, we must await a subsequent case for
elaboration.
Sovereign Incompatibility
As mentioned above, the Crown (in right of B.C.), throughout the Desautel litigation, argued that
the Lakes Tribe couldn’t possibly have Aboriginal rights in B.C., because any such rights would
be incompatible with the (federal) Crown’s power, as sovereign, to control its international
borders. No pre-existing practices, customs, and traditions deemed incompatible with the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, the Crown argued, could have survived post-sovereignty to
anchor present-day Aboriginal rights.96 “Taken in isolation,” the Crown acknowledged, “the
Aboriginal right to hunt claimed by Mr. Desautel is not incompatible with the Crown’s assertion
of sovereignty.”97 But any meaningful exercise of such a right, it argued, would require Lakes
Tribe members to cross the international border. And “[a]n aboriginal right, once established,
generally encompasses other rights necessary to its meaningful exercise.” 98 An Aboriginal right
to cross the international border is, in the Crown’s submission, incompatible with the (federal)
Crown’s sovereignty, because “[c]ontrol over the mobility of persons and goods into one country
is, and always has been, a fundamental attribute of sovereignty.” 99 As the majority judgment in
Desautel notes,100 this submission received support from the attorneys general of Quebec, New
Brunswick, and Alberta. Justice Côté, dissenting in Desautel, appears to have accepted it. 101
There is, at first blush, something disconcerting about this argument. The notion that nominate
rights encompass incidental rights arose in response to Indigenous parties’ (successful) efforts to
broaden the constitutionally protected scope of the treaty 102 or Aboriginal103 rights they had or
were asserting. Here, on the other hand, the Crown was attempting to embed a poison pill within
a claim of right that did not purport to include it. But the Supreme Court has taken liberties
before when characterizing communities’ claims of Aboriginal right;104 in Mitchell, most
particularly, it had insisted, over Grand Chief Mitchell’s objections, that the right he claimed –
an Aboriginal right to bring goods for trade across what by then had become an international
border – entailed a (redundant) incidental right to cross that border. 105 This was the precedent the
Crown sought to invoke in Desautel.
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The majority in Desautel declined this invitation. “I am of the view,” Justice Rowe said,
… that, unlike the right claimed in Mitchell, the very purpose of the right claimed by
Mr. Desautel is not to cross the border. The mobility right, if it exists, is incidental in
this case. Sovereign incompatibility would relate solely to the issue of whether there
can be an Aboriginal right to enter Canada – an issue that is not raised here, because
Mr. Desautel was not denied entry into Canada. Moreover, this issue was not fully
addressed by the courts below. Therefore, the question of whether the appropriate
framework is sovereign incompatibility or infringement/justification under Sparrow
should be left for another day, when the Court has a proper set of facts to answer the
question.106
In retrospect, it would have been easy to establish, one way or the other, whether the Aboriginal
right Mr. Desautel claimed on behalf of the Lakes Tribe includes an incidental right to cross the
international border. All it would have taken was to ask Mr. Desautel or his counsel whether
refusing him entry into Canada would infringe the Aboriginal right he was claiming. If the
answer were yes, then the Lakes Tribe’s claim of right would have included, necessarily, a claim
to an incidental right to cross the border. To all appearances, no one posed that question.
Suppose for now, then, that the Crown (in right of B.C.) is correct in its assertion that any
Aboriginal right the Lakes Tribe members have to hunt in B.C. includes an Aboriginal right to
cross the international border. What consequences ensue from that supposition?
To answer that question, we shall need criteria for use in deciding whether any given interest,
right or legal arrangement is compatible with the sovereignty of the Crown. That inquiry is
beyond the scope of the present discussion. Relevant surely to it, though, is the view of the
(federal) Crown, whose sovereignty the Lakes Tribe’s claim is said to have put at risk. Can
something be incompatible with the sovereignty of the Crown if the (federal) Crown itself
perceives no incompatibility?
As it happened, that was the situation in Desautel. In his written argument to the Supreme Court
of Canada, the Attorney General of Canada did not oppose Mr. Desautel’s claim on the basis of
sovereign incompatibility; he was content to defer the issue for consideration in a case where
someone was refused entry at the border. 107 Were such a case to arise, Canada continued, the
analysis should acknowledge that “Canada has, by its Constitution, limited the exercise of
government powers which may be inherent as a sovereign state. Section 35 [of the Constitution
Act, 1982] is one such limit; the Charter is another. Canadian authorities are subject to these selfimposed limitations on what would otherwise be an incident of sovereign power.” 108 Where
imposition of federal border control precludes someone from exercising her community’s
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Aboriginal right, “the framework to determine such matters generally lies in the law of
infringement and justification under the Sparrow framework.”109 Where infringement results,
“such infringement should be reviewed pursuant to the Sparrow framework. The outcome will
depend on the evidence in each case.” 110 In Canada’s view, therefore, Mr. Desautel’s claim of
Aboriginal right, even if successful, posed no challenges that the ordinary Canadian
constitutional framework could not address in the ordinary way.
In response, the Crown (in right of B.C.) might challenge the relevance here of the “self-imposed
limitation” on Crown sovereignty that Canada says section 35 represents. Pre-existing rights
deemed incompatible with Crown sovereignty, B.C. might argue, did not survive the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty and so cannot exist as rights cognizable in Canadian law. Consequently,
no such putative Aboriginal rights can qualify as “existing” Aboriginal rights eligible for
protection under section 35.
Regardless of the merits of such an argument more generally, it has no application on the facts of
Desautel. It was, after all, precisely because “the Sinixt had occupied territory in what is now
British Columbia at the time of European contact” and “the Lakes Tribe were a modern
successor of the Sinixt” that the Lakes Tribe qualified as “aboriginal peoples of Canada” for
purposes of section 35;111 it was because hunting in traditional Sinixt territory in what is now
B.C. was integral to the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the moment of contact that the Lakes Tribe
could establish a contemporary Aboriginal right to resume hunting there. 112 At the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty over what is now B.C. and agreed on the international border with
the United States in 1846, Sinixt were still there in significant numbers, engaging in the practice
that constituted the Aboriginal right. Those Sinixt had no need to cross an international border to
exercise their hunting right. Only those of their descendants who became the Lakes Tribe found
it necessary subsequently to do so. Whatever else we say about sovereign incompatibility,
therefore, the Aboriginal right to hunt in the part of traditional Sinixt territory that became B.C.
survived the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty because, at the time the Crown asserted
sovereignty there, neither the right nor its exercise implicated the international border. These are
conclusions the Desautel majority could have reached on the facts as found by the trial judge.
Choice of Proceedings
Desautel was a prosecution about regulatory offences. As a result, the only parties with standing
to give evidence at the trial were the Crown (in right of B.C.), seeking enforcement of the
offence provisions, and Mr. Desautel, claiming in defence the benefit of the Aboriginal right. 113
Others with potential interests in the fate of the Aboriginal right claim Mr. Desautel asserted – in
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particular, Indigenous communities resident in B.C. that included Sinixt descendants 114 and the
B.C. Métis115 – had no opportunity to lead evidence they considered relevant to the issue of
Aboriginal rights in respect of traditional Sinixt territory in southern British Columbia. Groups
representing those interests intervened at the Supreme Court of Canada in the Desautel appeal
and asked specifically that the court reach no conclusions that could prejudice claims of
Aboriginal right that they might assert. 116
The majority judgment in Desautel obliged,117 but took the opportunity to comment critically on
the limitations endemic to regulatory prosecutions. “[T]he defence of a prosecution for a
provincial regulatory offence,” Justice Rowe said at the outset of his judgment, “while it may
serve as a test case (as here), is not well suited to deal with such broader issues [as what Mr.
Desautel’s success means for the exercise of rights protected under s 35(1)]. Such issues are
better dealt with in an action setting out the right claimed, with a full evidentiary record, and
seeking declaratory relief.”118 Subsequently, he added this:
When parties are considering possible courses of action, it is useful to bear in mind
that criminal and regulatory proceedings have inherent limits proper to their nature.
In these types of cases, the evidence administered at trial is generally less extensive
and the rules are different than in a reference or a declaratory action.… As LeBel J.
stressed in his concurring reasons in Marshall,[119] at para. 142:
Although many of the aboriginal rights cases that have made their way to this
Court began by way of summary conviction proceedings, it is clear to me that we
should re-think the appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title
issues in the context of criminal trials. The issues that are determined in the
context of these cases have little to do with the criminality of the accused’s
conduct; rather, the claims would properly be the subject of civil actions for
declarations. Procedural and evidentiary difficulties, inherent in adjudicating
aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence, the interpretation of
evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary burdens, but also out of the
scope of appellate review of the trial judge’s findings of fact. These claims may
also impact on the competing rights and interests of a number of parties who may
have a right to be heard at all stages of the process. In addition, special difficulties
114
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come up when dealing with broad title and treaty rights claims that involve
geographic areas extending beyond the specific sites relating to the criminal
charges.120
This is not the first time (even apart from Marshall/Bernard) that the Court has preferred civil
proceedings to regulatory prosecutions for the purpose of resolving claims of Aboriginal right or
title. It did so first in Sparrow,121 then again by implication in Marshall 2,122 then again, more
explicitly, in Lax Kw’alaams.123 Why is it, then, that regulatory prosecutions continue so often to
be the vehicle of choice for Indigenous individuals or communities seeking authentication of
treaty or Aboriginal rights? Two reasons come to mind.
In the first place, the courts have restricted litigants’ access to civil proceedings as a means of
proving claims of Aboriginal right. The Supreme Court itself has precluded outright
consideration on the merits of such claims in judicial review proceedings, 124 and the BC Court of
Appeal has held that actions for declarations of Aboriginal right or title are not justiciable in the
absence of some allegation of “violation of or threat to” the right being claimed.125 (Never mind
that we all have some interest in knowing what Aboriginal rights there are, and to whom they
pertain.) On this view, a claim of infringement is the price of admission if an Indigenous group
wants to use civil proceedings to prove its claim of Aboriginal right, so the Indigenous claimant
had better come up with one. 126 Contravening an offence provision believed to infringe the
asserted right is one of the surer ways to equip oneself with a claim of infringement.
The second reason is the one Mark Underhill, lead counsel for Mr. Desautel, gave when asked
about this question a few weeks before the Desautel decision came out, at a panel discussion
about the case organized for students at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. His answer is
revealing. Civil proceedings involving claims of Aboriginal right, he suggested, take much too
long and cost much too much to be practicable options for Indigenous communities that have
limited means and urgent needs. In an imperfect world, test case prosecutions are often the most
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cost-effective means of obtaining timely, authoritative determinations of controversial claims of
Aboriginal right.
There’s a paradox here. The very features of civil proceedings that make them more attractive to
the Supreme Court for adjudication of complex Aboriginal rights claims make such proceedings
less attractive to many of the Indigenous communities in a position to assert such claims
credibly. That in itself might give one pause, but it has potential, as well, to affect the prospects
for negotiated resolution of the meritorious claims.
“Negotiation,” the majority judgment reiterated in Desautel, “has significant advantages for both
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples as a way to obtain clarity about Aboriginal rights”;127 “[t]rue
resolution is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms.” 128 But channeling Aboriginal rights
litigation into forms of proceedings typically beyond the means of the Indigenous claimants
reduces their bargaining power in any negotiations. Where litigation isn’t a meaningful option if
negotiations go poorly, the Indigenous parties may well feel they have little choice but to accept
what the Crown may offer them. The Crown, perceiving all this, may have little, if any, incentive
to take part in negotiations, except perhaps as required by the honour of the Crown and the still
undefined, unenforced, inchoate duty to negotiate that the honour of the Crown is said to
impose.129 Private litigants, against whom Indigenous communities seek to establish and enforce
Aboriginal rights,130 of course, have no such obligation to negotiate.
Indigenous communities of limited means do have at least one option under current law when
contemplating civil proceedings to establish and enforce Aboriginal rights. Superior courts, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held, have the option in some circumstances of awarding interim
costs to a party, irrespective of the eventual outcome, to facilitate the party’s full participation in
the proceedings.131 Indigenous parties using civil proceedings to advance their claims have
benefited from interim costs orders in the Okanagan132 and Tsilhqot’in133 actions, both of which
have involved assertions of Aboriginal title, and in Grassy Narrows,134 a case about treaty
interpretation.
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But there are, to put it very conservatively, no guarantees. The Supreme Court in Okanagan set
out three conditions a litigant must meet even to be eligible for an interim costs order. They are
not meant to be easy to satisfy.
The first requirement is that “[t]he party seeking costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for the
litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial.” 135 This, according
to the majority in Little Sisters, requires that the applicant for interim costs
… explore all other possible funding options. These include, but are not limited to,
public funding options like legal aid and other programs designed to assist various
groups in taking legal action. An advance costs award is neither a substitute for, nor a
supplement to, these programs. An applicant must also be able to demonstrate that an
attempt, albeit unsuccessful, has been made to obtain private funding through
fundraising campaigns, loan applications, contingency fee agreements and any other
available options.136
In the view of the Alberta Court of Appeal, a First Nation applicant must, in addition, devote
such resources as it has to funding the litigation, even if that means leaving unaddressed
“legitimate and reasonable ‘pressing infrastructural and social needs’” within the community.137
Other lower court jurisprudence suggests that litigants who initiate proceedings (including, for
instance, Indigenous plaintiffs seeking declarations of Aboriginal right) may find it more
difficult to satisfy this requirement than those “thrust into a situation requiring litigation” 138
(individuals facing, for instance, prosecution).
The second requirement is that the claim be “prima facie meritorious; that is, the claim [be] at
least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue
the case to be forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means.” 139 According to Little
Sisters, this test
… requires something more than mere proof that one’s case has sufficient merit not
to be dismissed summarily. Rather, an applicant must prove that the interests of
justice would not be served if a lack of resources made it necessary to abort the
litigation. The very wording of the requirement confirms that the interests of justice
will not be jeopardized every time a litigant is forced to withdraw from litigation for
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financial reasons. The reason for this is that the context in which merit is considered
is conditioned by the need to show that the case is exceptional. 140
Finally, “the issues raised” in the litigation must “transcend the individual interests of the
particular litigant, [be] of public importance, and [not have] been resolved in previous cases.” 141
To satisfy this expectation, the applicant for interim costs must meet each of its three component
requirements.142 “This means that a litigant whose case, however compelling it might be, is of
interest only to the litigant will be denied an advance costs award. It does not mean, however,
that every case of interest to the public will satisfy the test.” 143
As mentioned, some Indigenous communities have met these criteria and obtained orders of
interim costs to help finance litigation of their section 35 claims in civil courts. But few
Indigenous communities contemplating civil proceedings can have confidence that courts will
find their circumstances satisfy these requirements. And to be clear,
[t]hese are necessary conditions that must be met for an award of interim costs to be
available in cases of this type. The fact that they are met in a particular case is not
necessarily sufficient to establish that such an award should be made; that
determination is in the discretion of the court. If all three conditions are satisfied,
courts have a narrow jurisdiction to order that the impecunious party’s costs be paid
prospectively. Such orders should be carefully fashioned and reviewed over the
course of the proceedings to ensure that concerns about access to justice are balanced
against the need to encourage the reasonable and efficient conduct of litigation.144
Put differently, the Indigenous claimant may well be unsuccessful in obtaining interim costs even
if it has satisfied all three of the eligibility conditions. “It is only a ‘rare and exceptional’ case
that is special enough to warrant an advance costs award.”145 And even then, it will be
prospective only; it will not cover those costs the Indigenous litigant has already incurred prior to
the interim costs award. 146
In brief, both the doctrinal impediments and the financial risks of civil litigation are substantial,
and the prospects of relief from the latter by means of interim costs awards guarded, for
Indigenous communities with limited means but potentially meritorious claims of Aboriginal
right.147 While this remains so, such communities have reason to continue provoking regulatory
prosecutions to test their claims of Aboriginal or treaty right, despite the evident disadvantages
such proceedings have for that purpose when compared with full-dress civil proceedings. If the
Supreme Court of Canada is serious about preferring civil proceedings to prosecutions for this
140
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purpose, it is going to have to acknowledge and address this predicament. It will have a chance
to do so late in 2021 in a First Nation’s advance costs appeal. 148
Conclusion
The Desautel case decided a major issue: that Indigenous groups who are not resident in Canada
can have constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights if they had traditional territory here prior to
contact with Europeans. The decision also reaffirmed that Aboriginal rights are not lost as a
result of long periods of non-user, especially if that was a result of colonial displacement, as it
almost always would be. Britain and the United States drew boundaries in North America that
disregarded entirely the existence of Indigenous nations such as the Sinixt, whose territories were
severed in the process. Indigenous peoples were absorbed into the nation-states of Canada and
the United States and made unwelcome in their traditional territories on the other side of the
border, causing them to be separated from some of their lands and relations. Justice Smith, in her
unanimous decision for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, saw the injustice in this:
Imposing a requirement that Indigenous peoples may only hold Aboriginal rights in
Canada if they occupy the same geographical area in which their ancestors exercised
those rights, ignores the Aboriginal perspective, the realities of colonization and does
little towards achieving the ultimate goal of reconciliation. In this case, such a
requirement would extinguish Mr. Desautel’s right to hunt in the traditional territory
of his ancestors even though the rights of his community in that geographical area
were never voluntarily surrendered, abandoned or extinguished. 149
In his majority Supreme Court decision, Justice Rowe likewise took account of the fact that
the “displacement of Aboriginal peoples as a result of colonization is well acknowledged” by
quoting the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
Aboriginal peoples were displaced physically – they were denied access to their
traditional territories and in many cases actually forced to move to new locations
selected for them by colonial authorities. They were also displaced socially and
culturally, subject to intensive missionary activity and the establishment of schools –
which undermined their ability to pass on traditional values to their children,
imposed male-oriented Victorian values, and attacked traditional activities such as
significant dances and other ceremonies. In North America they were also displaced
politically, forced by colonial laws to abandon or at least disguise traditional
governing structures and processes in favour of colonial-style municipal
institutions.150
Acknowledgement of these realities by the courts is a significant step towards reconciliation.
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